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SHOULD THE US PULL OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE?
Edwin

H. Fedder

Has the US overstayed its· welcome in Western E~rope?

Have the

Europeans come to rely on the US to such an extent that they can no
longer rely on themselves?

These questions and scores of related

questions were stimulated by a talk recently delivered by a professor
of political science at the f~ee University of Berl i·n.

Ptofessor

Helmut Wagner, a specialist on American foreign pol icy, feels that
dependence upon the US has frustrated the drive for the unification
of Europe.

Like an excessively overprotective parent, the US has

smothered and stultified the infant Europe and rendered it, temporarily
at least, incapable of standing on its own resources.
Coming from a knowledgable and well-placed German, this is startling
if not heretical stuff.

Had a Frenchman or even a Britisher uttered

such thoughts, his 1 isteners would have been less taken aback.

Germany

is the front 1 ine of defens~ for Westerru Europe vis-a-vis the East.
European powers are more exposed or even as exposed I as is Germany to
military pressure from the East if political conditions deteriorated
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significantly.

And Germany has to rely upon the United States for its

ultimate support since only the US has power sufficient to deter the
Russians were they inclined to move against the West

the French and

British ~uclear forces are not adequate to that task even were they to
be combined, a quite unlikely development.
Wagner's solution is for the United States to declare that as of
a certain date say four years hence, the United States will withdraw all
military forces from the European continent.

The Europeans then would

have that four year interval to set their houses in order, to complete
the integration hinted at and begun in the formation of the European
· Community,- and to create the true United States of Europe that was only
dreamed of in the early post-war decades.
The present conditi6n is a legacy of World War I I, which left
Europe devastated, defeated and divided.

US mil itaiy forces, which were

expected to remain for two years, still occupy part of West Berl in and
provide-the central thrust for European self defense.

US military

forces are hostage to and provide thestrakegic core for European
security.

3 -Thirty-four years have passed since the war's end -- years that have
wi~nessed unrivaled prosperity despite ~hronic tension and recurring
bouts of despair.

A chronicle of events in Europe from.the Marshall

P1an to the founding of the. European Community and from NATO to the
Helsinki Conference provide a· litany for the end of an epoch.

The

world that we knew, which had been sol ittle changed for centuries>
was now a backwater to the ebb and flow of historic tides.

Russia

and America dominated once proud European states who trembled when
either sneezed.

Europe came to be divided into two hostile camps,

West and East, symbolized by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

And Germany,

the most dynamic European state for the past century at least, the
Germany of Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, and Adolph Hitler was truncated,
dismembered, and permanently divided that it might not rise again.
For three decades, Germany eschewed politics and kept a low
profile while carefully nurturing French, British and American good
will.

A better, more pliant ally could not be found.

But then con-

ditions changed: Britain declined, France is declining and the US, overreacting to the lessons of Vi~tnem, assumed a passive posture and began
to be overtaken by events.
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After Vietnam, can Europeans continue to be certain that the US
will risk war with the USSR in order to protect European interests?
Russia is far more powerful today and Russian interests are more
extensively expressed (in Africa, Asia, Latin America) than in NATO's
earlier days.

And yet, according to Wagner, Western Europe is no

better equipped to fend for itself, to protect its own interests
today than it was in the early days of NATO.
Wagner is convinced that the US presence is not permanent, that
pressures will mount that will inexorably lead to US withdrawal.
in five or even ten years perhaps, but at some future date.

Not

And unless

the European states get their act together, they_will be no better prepared to fend for themselves than they are today.
If Wagner is right, Germany, Britain, France and the others would
pursue the only rational course: unification at all deliberate speed.
National rivalries would be sublimated to the pressing need for security
because as Wagner .sees things, a divided Europe will lack adequate resources to contain the spread of Sovi~t hegemony.

If, as seems more likely, he is wrong, at least the smaller states
of Northern Europe (Denmark and Norway) and Southeastern Europe (Greece
and Turkey)-might well find the path chosen by Finland more secure;

they

~ould then place themselves clearly in the Russian sphere of influence while
largely m~intaining internal self detefmination.

And Germany ltself

might not long resist pressures for Finlandization.
The principal trouble with Wagner's analysis rests upon his
assumption that European unification would be more 1 ikely than

.I

Finlandization if the US pulled out.

Most specialists seem to agree

that unification would be much more difficult to achieve if it is
,possible at all; that national rivalries are greater than any
notions of unity.

Findlandiz~tion, however, Js a s~ectre haunting

Europe at the present time •.
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